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Abstract
In recent years governments have shown themselves
willing to impose blackouts to shut off key commu-
nication infrastructure during times of civil strife, and
to surveil citizen communications whenever possible.
However, it is exactly during such strife that citizens
need reliable and anonymous communications the most.
In this paper, we present Rangzen, a system for anony-
mous broadcast messaging during network blackouts.
Rangzen is distinctive in both aim and design. Our
aim is to provide an anonymous, one-to-many messag-
ing layer that requires only users’ smartphones and can
withstand network-level attacks. Our design is a delay-
tolerant mesh network which deprioritizes adversarial
messages by means of a social graph while preserving
user anonymity. We built a complete implementation that
runs on Android smartphones, present benchmarks of its
performance and battery usage, and present simulation
results suggesting Rangzen’s efficacy at scale.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, the balance of power between citi-
zens and governments has tilted inexorably in the latter’s
direction. Though there was once a perception of the
Internet as a land of radically free communication and
activism, it has become clear that like any key infrastruc-
ture, the Internet exists under centralized control [65].
While this has proved to be a boon to the average user
under placid conditions—large companies are able to de-
liver efficient and reliable services and governments are
able to police networks for criminal activity—in times of
unrest, this has proven dangerous to those who would use
the Internet as a forum to speak out.
Indeed, during societal unrest, centralized infrastruc-
ture can be easily co-opted. In recent years, authorities
in Egypt, Iran, and Syria, among others, have shut down
their already heavily-surveilled Internet access during
times when citizens were questioning those very author-
ities’ political legitimacy [13, 20, 64]. However, it is ex-
actly in such moments that citizens need the ability to
communicate without restriction and risk of retribution.
In particular, in such a scenario, not only is anonymity
important, but also the resilience of the communication
system to network-level censorship (at multiple layers).
To address this need we built Rangzen, an anonymous
large-scale messaging system robust to network attacks.
We built a complete implementation of Rangzen for the
Android platform utilizing Bluetooth and WiFi Direct to
communicate from pocket to pocket between stock, non-
rooted, Android version 4.x, 5.x, and 6.x devices. Our
implementation consists of over 17,000 lines of Java and
another 4,000 lines of unit tests; our implementation is
publicly available [53].
The literature contains a wide range of work on anony-
mous communication systems. However, most exist-
ing work targets point-to-point communication over ded-
icated infrastructure (e.g., over the Internet, which is
unavailable in a blackout context), such as Tor [22].
Another, less-well-known branch of research focuses
on point-to-point anonymous communication in the ab-
sence of dedicated infrastructure [37]. In addition, some
widely-promoted free apps such as FireChat also aim
to provide point-to-point communication without infras-
tructure, but fail to provide anonymity or any mecha-
nisms to withstand attacks by adversaries [29, 55].
Rangzen differs from prior work by focusing on one-
to-many, anonymous communication without dedicated
infrastructure while providing resilience to network level
attacks, meeting a need which has arisen with surpris-
ing regularity around the world in recent years (§2). To
the best of our knowledge, no existing work explores
this region of the design space. A core aspect of our
work is that we address a key tension between anonymity
(which demands that user identities be hidden) and ro-
bustness to network-level attacks (which requires some
notion of reputation or identity, despite user anonymity).
In addition, we focused on designing and building a sys-
tem that works in practice and meets the needs of real
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users—dissidents and activists with whom we have been
in contact—in medium-risk contexts.
Two main challenges characterize this context: a) a
lack of functioning infrastructure (neither Internet nor
cell networks) and b) adversaries intent upon widespread
interference. We address the first challenge by broadcast-
ing messages over a delay-tolerant, smartphone-based,
mobile mesh network. This architecture enables resilient
albeit high-latency communication. We address the sec-
ond challenge with a decentralized, novel social trust-
based prioritization algorithm. Counterintuitively, our
prioritization approach allows Rangzen to rank the trust-
worthiness of messages without knowing their origin or
author; this property preserves author anonymity. In this
decentralized setting it is not possible to entirely elimi-
nate adversarial messages, as there exists no trusted au-
thority that can authenticate users or messages. However,
as a result of Rangzen’s ranking algorithm, adversarial
messages arrive with low scores that enable easy filter-
ing, and propagate more slowly through the network.
We have worked with activists in countries with
widespread censorship and political repression to en-
sure Rangzen represents a realistic system that addresses
challenges real people face in the modern world. As a
result, it was key for Rangzen to work on unmodified
modern mobile devices; a previous generation of mobile
mesh protocols using smartphones typically required the
ability to craft custom layer-2 frames [47,66], something
only available on rooted phones; ordinary users seldom
have rooted phones, so this significantly limits deploy-
ability. To work around network stack limitations, we
developed a hybrid protocol (§5) that uses a combination
of WiFi Direct and Bluetooth and works on unmodified
Android devices without needing user interaction.
Our experimental results show Rangzen is practical:
devices in proximity for under 10 seconds can find one
another, perform cryptographic social-trust prioritiza-
tion, and exchange several hundred messages (§6). Even
in the unrealistic worst case of constant communication,
Rangzen uses only about 5.5% of the battery of a Nexus
5 per hour, suggesting that under realistic conditions its
energy use would be quite reasonable, especially in a net-
work blackout. Our simulations suggest that if deployed
widely, Rangzen would provide useful messaging within
a large city (§7). Specifically, we show that Rangzen
can reach over 90% of a city-wide userbase within 24
hours of a message’s composition while effectively ham-
pering attacks such as jamming and the spread of propa-
ganda. In simulation, an ideally-situated attacker’s mes-
sages reached 30% fewer users than an ordinary (non-
ideal), legitimate user’s messages over a period of 48
hours.
2 Background and Motivation
The design of a communication system for use during
network blackouts and similar settings is a complex un-
dertaking. Social and political dynamics constrain both
user desires and adversarial actions. On one hand, it
would be naı¨ve to design technology to respond to cen-
sorship or blackouts in countries or regions with extreme
levels of repression (e.g., North Korea), as far more than
a technological solution is required [69]. On the other
hand, places with relatively low levels of risk and repres-
sion (e.g., Hong Kong) generally do not require special-
ized solutions such as Rangzen. Thus in this work we
target medium-risk regions (e.g., Kazakhstan). In such
medium-risk environments, while there exist harsh re-
strictions on free speech and public protest, especially
in Internet-based communication, authorities do not typ-
ically resort to open violence or mass arrest.
In this work we have been in contact with dissidents
and activists in medium-risk contexts, and this has helped
us gain a better understanding of their needs and has in-
formed our design choices. Understanding these con-
straints is crucial to designing and building a system that
is realistic in its aims and limits. In this section we
present an abridged analysis of this context and its im-
plications for Rangzen.
2.1 The Need for Anonymity
Technology’s role in the spread of dissent is complex.
In most recent political movements, smartphone- and
Internet-based organizing was prevalent across social de-
mographics [7, 11, 25, 33, 46, 74, 81]. Governments re-
sponded by leveraging the same communications net-
works not only to surveil [28] but also to intimidate cit-
izens [77]. Although such technology certainly enables
the spread of information, in many cases that very infor-
mation has helped governments to target activists to an
unprecedented degree; this targeting ranges from identi-
fying dissenters online to harassing citizens who possess
out-of-the-ordinary communication hardware [26].
Implication: During periods of social unrest, commu-
nication systems should protect individuals from be-
ing directly linked to objectionable content.
2.2 The Need for Robustness
The communications blackouts that motivate our work
are not accidents, and are due to a desire to stem the
tide of public discontent. Nevertheless, the means by
which blackouts have been implemented and their de-
gree of totality have varied considerably. Some black-
outs have involved BGP route withdrawals [16], while
others have been more severe cuts [67]. In addition, total
blackouts are made easier for governments to impose by
a non-diverse network infrastructure with few providers
and/or heavy government control. During these black-
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et Tor [22], Crowds [63], LAP [35],
VPNs [3, 59], HORNET [10], Aqua [42],
Tarzan [30], Rome [60], Herd [41],
Cashmere [84], Free Haven [21]
Twitter [73],
Whisper [78, 79] DC Nets [8], Dissent [15]
Table 1: Design space of relevant mesh and anonymous communication systems, with canonical examples. We omit
insecure one-to-one communication in this comparison due to its ubiquity.
outs, governments are likely to try to thwart any tempo-
rary workarounds used by the population. A robust net-
work need not ensure connectivity for every single per-
son (as individuals can be targeted) but for the masses.
Implication: The cause or mechanism of a blackout
should not impact the subsequent operation of the
system, and the system should resist unilateral, global
shut-down or takeover.
2.3 The Paradox of Fast Communication
Recently, political theorists have studied the imperma-
nence of so-called “Twitter revolutions”, commenting on
the absence of slow, steady community organizing and
in-person contact that has led to lasting political move-
ments in the past [72]. The determining factor in the
outcomes of such crises is largely an enigma, though the
strength of the underlying movements has been a crucial
factor [34]. While only history will adjudicate the im-
pact of modern communications tools in these settings,
our conversations with activists and the historical record
suggests that rapid communication is not crucial.
Implication: The system need not enable rapid com-
munication, but it should enable trustworthy and ro-
bust communication.
3 Related Work
In Table 1 we categorize the design space of related
anonymous communications systems. A number of cryp-
tographic, anonymous broadcast protocols exist [6,9,15,
45], but it is unclear whether such protocols are well-
suited for large-scale adoption in resource-starved envi-
ronments. The problem is particularly challenging in a
blackout, which prevents the use of online trust mech-
anisms, such as Bitcoin-based protocols [52]. On the
other hand, much of DTN security research has focused
on one-to-one communication [4, 24, 27]; our problem
is more related to filtering content in a distributed and
privacy-preserving manner. Any solution in this setting
must be lightweight so as to function during short op-
portunistic encounters. Many practical and academic
anonymity systems attempt to resolve this tension us-
ing pseudonymous reputation systems [37, 68], but us-
ing pseudonyms increases susceptibility to side-channel
correlation attacks [19, 54, 62].
Our approach relates to Sybil defense [58, 76, 80, 82]
through our use of social graph structure to distinguish
users. Similarly, our approach builds on a rich cryp-
tography literature on distributed, privacy-preserving
trust [31, 36, 70], and more specifically, private set
intersection over social data to achieve privacy and
anonymity [43,44,71]; we explore our application of this
in the next section.
4 Architecture and Protocol
Each aspect of Rangzen’s design is based on the prin-
ciples we discussed in §2. The prevalence of smart-
phones and their use in community organizing enables
the basic architecture: a mesh composed entirely of
smartphones. The communication model is delay toler-
ant (§2.3).1 Rangzen provides anonymity (§2.1) to au-
thors to enable free speech without persecution, and it
sidesteps attacks based on pseudonymity by providing
full anonymity instead. To provide trust in messages and
to suppress propaganda and spam, we filter and prioritize
based on social trust between user nodes at propagation
time, rather than directly between readers and authors.
Borrowing from Sybil defense schemes [82], Rangzen
assumes that messages are more trustworthy if they reach
a reader via a path of trusted nodes. In Rangzen, we de-
termine trust without knowing the identity of the node
which forwarded the message. We use a cryptographic
PSI-Ca (Private Set Intersection Cardinality) protocol to
determine the number of common peers in the (implicit)
social graph shared by communicating nodes; the more
friends in common, the more trust assigned to the con-
veyed messages.
1Real-time networks over meshes are difficult and potentially frag-
ile, while our delay tolerant system is both robust and is sufficiently fast
to enable community organization (messages propagating in minutes to
hours, depending on user density and mobility).
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4.1 Threat Model
Our adversary is a state-level actor capable and willing
to disable infrastructure such as cellular networks and
ISP networks providing links to the Internet. The ad-
versary’s goals are to disrupt communication and to in-
ject false information (i.e., propaganda). Such an adver-
sary shares similarities to those considered in Sybil de-
fense work—although the adversary may be physically
distributed and possess significant technological and fi-
nancial resources, its weakness is an inability to socially
infiltrate its enemies at scale. The adversary’s Sybils
will nearly always have fewer friendships with honest
nodes than the honest nodes have among themselves.2
This is a common assumption in the Sybil defense lit-
erature [76, 82]. A worst-case adversary might violate
this assumption by recruiting spies from the general pop-
ulation. However, even the most heavy-handed adver-
saries in history—such as the Stasi—used only 2% of
the citizenry as informants [39]. Moreover, if there are
no characteristics distinguishing adversaries from regular
citizens, the Sybil detection problem cannot be solved in
the first place [23].
Non-Goals. We assume that the adversary has the re-
sources to single out individual users and perform severe,
targeted, violent or social attacks against them. We do
not protect against such targeted attacks. Rangzen aims
to make it infeasible for the adversary to scale their at-
tacks, making it impossible for them to deceive a large
percentage of the population, or to disrupt communica-
tions on a large scale. We consider preventing the scaling
of attacks beyond a small percentage of citizens to be a
fundamental win, as have some privacy scholars [32].
While phone-to-phone exchanges are private, message
content itself is not private in Rangzen. As with a pub-
lic system like Twitter, messages are public. By contrast,
authorship is confidential and protected. Further, the use
of Rangzen is detectable by an attacker. The attacker
can participate in the system. Rangzen does not seek
to hide the fact that Rangzen is being used. Instead, it
relies on decentralization to protect it from attack. Hid-
ing the identities of devices from a local eavesdropper
is orthogonal to our goals; while Rangzen does not by
default hide the device’s identifiers (e.g., Bluetooth and
WiFi MAC addresses) as this requires rooting, users with
rooted phones can randomize their MAC addresses. In
addition, we assume that an attacker cannot easily per-
form man-in-the-middle attacks at scale against phone
exchanges as it would require anticipating and suppress-
ing each pair of phones’ physically more proximate com-
munications while injecting false messages during con-
nection establishment. We also do not consider zero-day
2In Rangzen these friendships must be made in person, making at-
tacks against friend establishment difficult to scale.
attacks against Rangzen and PSI-Ca; while these may
occur, there is no plausible method for preventing them,
and the best remedy is that we have built the system in a
modular fashion to enable rapid re-engineering of com-
promised modules.
More generally, our goal is to enable anonymous and
robust communication in situations where the majority of
phones are in use by honest users and cellular/Internet in-
frastructure is not working. As we have learned from our
discussions with users in these contexts, real-time com-
munication in these settings is largely needed for dissem-
inating live information to the outside world and satellite
is ideal for this; within the blackout region itself, for the
majority of users, asynchronous and moderate-speed in-
formation dissemination is sufficient.
4.2 Design Overview
Delay-Tolerant Mesh Network. Rangzen forms a mo-
bile, ad-hoc, delay-tolerant network of smartphones.
The network propagates microblogs—broadcasted, pub-
lic datagrams, much like Tweets—which are passed op-
portunistically between devices in physical proximity.
Messages will spread rapidly through a crowd of peo-
ple who have Rangzen installed on their phones over the
course of tens of seconds or minutes. Messages need
not spread in real time; they are stored on devices and
forwarded opportunistically when another device run-
ning Rangzen is encountered. Users need not actively
participate in forwarding messages, as Rangzen runs in
the background, periodically searching for nearby de-
vices and sending and receiving messages to and from
those devices. Thus messages will also spread over time
through a city or region as people move, passing on the
street, riding transit, or spending time together.
Prioritization Based on Mutual Friendships. Rangzen
nodes trust messages forwarded to them by other nodes
with whom they share mutual friends. Each node stores
a priority value in [0,1] with each message, which is
displayed to users and used to order messages in the
UI. Low-priority messages are displayed to the user at
the bottom of the feed, or not at all. When two users
meet and exchange of messages, low trust messages are
the last to be forwarded. Low trust messages may be
deleted from storage by Rangzen nodes. It is important
to note that message spread in Rangzen does not depend
upon users sending messages directly (and only) to their
friends; instead, two users who have never met before
can exchange messages and the trust calculated (but not
the communication) depends upon their mutual friends.
As such, the communication graph can effectively be
more richly connected than the friendship graph.
Nodes determine the trust to put in each message
based upon their trust of the device which forwarded the
message. Since Rangzen is a fully anonymous system,
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no authorship information is stored in messages. Trust
must be based entirely upon relationships between the
nodes, who store and forward the messages. Trust be-
tween devices is based upon mutual friendships. When
Alice receives messages from Bob, Alice assigns trust
to those messages proportional to the number of friends
they have in common.
These friendships are real-life relationships, and they
must be formed in person through the exchange of secrets
between the friends’ smartphones. These friend estab-
lishments can be made at user’s leisure before a blackout
happens, or during a blackout. Each device uses a secure
source of randomness, available via the crypto library,
to generate a random 128-bit identifier upon first launch
of Rangzen; we assume due to the size of the IDs that
they are unique. During friend establishment, Rangzen
displays on the screen a QR code containing a hash of
the user’s Rangzen random ID, which can be scanned
by another user to form a friendship. When two de-
vices communicate, they use the PSI-Ca protocol, learn-
ing the number of friends they have in common without
revealing who their friends are, or even which friends
are shared. Each node then assigns trust to messages re-
ceived in the exchange based on the number of common
friends.
Suppressing Propaganda via the Friend Graph.
Friendships in Rangzen can be viewed as forming a trust
graph in which each user is a node, and graph edges rep-
resent real-life trust relationships between people. We
leverage this trust graph to suppress the adversary’s pro-
paganda. Since the adversary cannot form friendships
with real users on a widespread basis (§4.1), propa-
ganda sent by adversarial nodes will reach genuine users
through message exchanges including very few common
friends. Thus Rangzen nodes will assign lower degrees
of trust to adversarial messages, compared to messages
from genuine users. Propaganda messages will tend to
be dropped automatically or hidden from user view, re-
ducing their influence on the communications happening
through Rangzen.
4.3 Peer Exchange Protocol
Rangzen’s mesh communication is achieved via
lightweight, pairwise message exchanges. Here we de-
fine the protocol two peers use when they encounter one
another to propagate messages, intersect friend sets, and
finally how each uses the information it has received to
quantify social trust and discriminate between messages.
Lightweight Protocol. The Rangzen protocol is
lightweight and simple. Peers establish an encrypted
phone-to-phone communication channel; we describe in
detail in §5 how we overcome phone limitations to es-
tablish this channel. Once the channel is established, we
perform a friend set intersection and message exchange
in each direction in sequence, encoding all messages
using Google protocol buffers to ensure correct parsing.
We abort and discard the exchange if any errors occur.
We implement the one-round PSI-Ca protocol of Cristo-
faro et al. [17], which is ideal because it only relies
upon standard assumptions and Diffie-Hellman group
operations that are available in standard Android crypto
libraries. Our implementation of this protocol is about
400 lines of Java. This enables two nodes to compute the
cardinality of the mutual friend set, but not the identity
of those friends. The client message includes not only
PSI-Ca information but also the set of messages and
priorities that the device knows of.
Social Trust Metric. We assume that a) people trust
and want to see messages from people socially well
connected to them, and b) adversarial nodes cannot
infiltrate the social graph at scale. To capture these
ideas, each pair of nodes computes a social trust score
during each opportunistic encounter. We let T (a,b)
denote how much a trusts b:
T (a,b) = max
(
F(a)∩F(b)
F(a)
,ε
)
where F(a) denotes the set of a’s friends, and ε is
a small positive constant that ensures that ordering is
preserved—even if the nodes share no mutual friends.
We expect users to have around 30 trusted friends, and
limit the number of friends that can be submitted to any
PSI interaction accordingly, since we consider the trust
between people with, for example, 30 and 70 common
friends to be similar. This restricts numbers of common
friends to small integers, reducing the extent to which
common friend degree can distinguish unique users.
Mapping from trust to priority. After receiving mes-
sages from Bob, Alice’s node must decide where to in-
sert those messages in her feed. In our implementation,
she simply multiplies the priority score of each message
according to the sender by her trust of the sender. These
mechanisms may be more effective for ensuring message
propagation and the effective filtering of propaganda; we
also consider the use of a distorted function that assigns
more trust to senders with a threshold number of mutual
friends. Additionally, to give message authors increased
deniability, each sender adds noise to each message’s pri-
ority score before sending it to a new node. We show in
§7 that this improves deniability.
More precisely, if a receives a message from b with
priority 0 ≤ po ≤ 1, then a will insert the message into
her queue with a priority that is a sigmoidal function of
the trust score:
Tr10[(pb,a(T (a,b))× po)+ za],
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where za ∼ N (µ,σ2) is additive Gaussian noise used
to improve message propagation,3 Tr10[x] is a threshold
forcing x to be in the range [0,1], and
pb,a(T (a,b)) =
1
1+ exp{−ρ(T (a,b)− τ)} . (1)
In essence this means a will trust b fully if the ratio of
mutual friends is greater than τ . We used ρ = 13 and τ =
0.3 for a sigmoid that transitioned sharply in the range
[0,1].4 If a device runs out of storage, the lowest-priority
messages get dropped first.
4.4 Authoring and Message Management
Rangzen presents users with an ordinary microblogging
messaging interface. The local user writes new mes-
sages, which are initialized to have priority 1. If a user
particularly likes a message from another node, she can
choose to upvote the message. Note that since mes-
sages are anonymous, upvoting a message to priority 1
is equivalent to reauthoring it. Users should avoid re-
vealing their identities through message content; unfor-
tunately, this is difficult to prevent with technological so-
lutions alone, and as with all anonymous communication
systems, user education is critical. Finally, Rangzen de-
cays the priority of messages over time so that out-of-
date content gradually leaves the system. Low priority
messages are shown last, and those below a threshold can
be hidden; this ensures that even those adversarial mes-
sages that do get propagated do not affect normal users.
4.5 Security Discussion
An attacker spreading propaganda must do so via the
Rangzen protocol because nodes only accept Rangzen
protocol messages. A Rangzen node will only store a
new message if the message is authored by the node it-
self or received during a peer encounter. Attackers that
do not corrupt the Rangzen software itself must therefore
attack the peer encounter protocol to spread messages.
Unique device identifiers. An attacker may attempt to
identify individual devices and their owners that are us-
ing Rangzen. Rooted devices can randomize the device’s
MAC addresses on each exchange.5
Propaganda spread. Rangzen nodes reject messages
from peers that do not complete PSI-Ca. If the attacker
performs PSI-Ca then their success at spreading propa-
ganda (messages with high priority scores) depends upon
the ability to form friendships with real users (§4.1). It is
difficult for attackers to form friendships with significant
3This noise parameter helps unpopular nodes spread content by ran-
domly increasing (or decreasing) priority scores, but it also improves
author anonymity. We show this in §7.3.
4These constants would need to be tuned in a real deployment based
on real mobility and friendship patterns.
5Physical-layer device-unique characteristics are more difficult to
detect but also harder to conceal on unmodified commodity devices.
numbers of real users, and as a result their messages will
be penalized by the trust score calculation when propa-
gated. The bottleneck between real users and attackers
in the trust graph has been used in other application do-
mains, such as Bazaar [58], for a similar purpose.
Attacking friend addition. Rangzen only adds friend
IDs via in-person exchanges, and these IDs are random
and private. Thus attackers must either capture devices
or socially engineer targets to befriend users. An attacker
who learns friend IDs can store them, forming directed
edges in the graph. We rely upon standard device secu-
rity to ensure the safety of friend IDs on phones them-
selves. We also designed but did not implement a dis-
tributed ID revocation protocol. These enhancements are
orthogonal to our design and could be implemented in
settings that require them.
Attacking trust computation. We place very few de-
mands on the PSI protocol, and our choice of algorithm
relies only upon standard (Diffie-Hellman) assumptions.
Should the PSI algorithm succumb to cryptanalysis in
the future, our modular implementation and design en-
ables its easy replacement. Thus Rangzen is safeguarded
against future cryptanalytic breakthroughs.
Chosen-Input Attack. Adversaries can learn social
graph edges only by submitting IDs to the PSI protocol
per encounter, posing as a normal user. The adversary
must first acquire such an ID, which is only available to
a user’s real friends, through another type of attack (e.g.,
device confiscation). If the attacker includes one ID and
the intersection is cardinality 1, the attacker learns that
their communication partner is friends with that ID. We
call this a chosen-input attack on the trust computation.
If an adversary can confiscate significant numbers of de-
vices from users in an intact state, unlock those devices,
and extract friend IDs, and then use these IDs to perform
a chosen-input attack against peers it meets, this would
at most allow the adversary to gradually learn the social
graph, as we consider in Appendix B. It is unclear that
this is the most efficient way for any adversaries to learn
social connections between people; they might instead
examine online social media.6 Given that there is no di-
rect defense of this attack (since the Rangzen setting is
one in which there is no trusted authority, so there is no
way to prevent Sybil attacks), we enable users to rate
limit encounters to reduce information leaked through
this channel depending on their level of risk tolerance.
Denial of Service. Attackers may attempt to launch de-
nial of service attacks by overwhelming the system with
6An out-of-band social-media based attack is always possible in
any system that leverages person-to-person connections. However with
Rangzen such attacks are harder because ubiquitous surveillance of
Rangzen user exchanges is highly unrealistic. Also note that an ex-
ternal social graph cannot be used to forge identities in Rangzen, as
Rangzen IDs are random.
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messages. Neither storage nor bandwidth can be over-
whelmed by such a flood of messages since the prior-
itization mechanism applies to all such messages, and
clients can terminate exchanges that go on too long. We
study attackers that jam the airwaves in §7.2.4.
5 Implementation
We implemented Rangzen as an Android app. In build-
ing Rangzen, we had several goals, including that it be
easy for users to use correctly, efficient in terms of bat-
tery life, and able to propagate messages quickly and at
a distance. Unmodified smartphone platforms have limi-
tations that make this a challenge; in this section we dis-
cuss some of those difficulties and our engineering ef-
forts to overcome them. To enable peer exchanges with-
out user interaction, we take a novel approach that com-
bines several technologies available on Android phones
since OS version 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich): WiFi Direct
(known as Wifi P2P in Android) and Bluetooth. Our im-
plementation consists of over 17,000 lines of Java. Our
test suite additionally contains over 4,000 lines of Java.
In our conversation with activists, it is customary in
medium-risk countries that users who do not have ac-
cess to an app store will side-load the Rangzen app and
share the apk with other interested users through phone-
to-phone file sharing. We expect the common case to be
that activists who are concerned about privacy will side-
load the app after downloading it via Tor, while those
who are less concerned will install it from an app store.
We ran Rangzen on 7 models of Android devices: A
Nexus 5, a first-generation Nexus 7, a second-generation
Nexus 7, a Nexus 4, a Samsung Galaxy S4, a Samsung
Galaxy S5, and an HTC One X. These devices were run-
ning stock Android 5.0, stock Android 4.4.4, stock An-
droid 4.4.2, Cyanogenmod 11, a Verizon build of An-
droid 4.3, and an AT&T build of Android 4.0.3 at vari-
ous points in the testing process. These older phones are
reflective of devices often in use in countries of interest.
5.1 Assumptions
We assumed modern but not cutting-edge devices and
operating systems for the users of Rangzen, as this re-
flects the distribution of devices in countries of inter-
est. Our prototype functions on any version of Android
which supports WiFi Direct (4.0 and greater). Android
4.0 was released in 2012 and our target versions include
over 97% of Android devices operating today [2].
We assume that requiring users to root their devices
would be an unacceptable burden; similarly, we aimed
to not require user input to enable passive message for-
warding. Thus we rejected approaches which burdened
the user in any of these ways.
5.2 Engineering Challenges
We found that it was difficult to implement mesh net-
working capabilities in Android. The hardware supports
a variety of protocols which in principle offer convenient
peer-to-peer capabilities, including Bluetooth, Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE), ordinary WiFi, hotspot mode WiFi,
and WiFi Direct. However, the OS limits the ways
we can use these technologies. Here we discuss these
limitations before we describe our hybrid solution.
Ad-hoc WiFi Requires Root. Ad-hoc WiFi, a classic
approach for peer-to-peer communication over WiFi
enabled devices, requires a rooted phone. We opted not
to require the user to root their phone for the sake of
deployability.
Bluetooth Discoverability Requires User Input.
Bluetooth offers the ability to discover other Bluetooth
devices, connect to them, and exchange messages. To be
discovered, a device must become discoverable, a state
in which it broadcasts its presence. For security and user
experience reasons, the developers of Android chose
to require direct user input any time a device wishes
to become discoverable. This model would prevent
Rangzen from operating without user intervention.
While we ended up using Bluetooth for data transfer, we
do not use it to discover peers.
WiFi Direct Data Requires User Input. WiFi Direct
is a peer-to-peer protocol using WiFi chips that enables
devices to discover peers, connect, and exchange data.
Unlike Bluetooth, Android’s WiFi Direct implementa-
tion does not require user intervention for devices to
discover one another. However, it does require user input
to connect and transfer data with a newly discovered
peer.7 Thus while other devices can be discovered over
WiFi Direct, a data connection cannot be formed without
user input.
Bluetooth Low Energy Not Universal. While BLE
provides means for interaction-free communication, it
is not universally supported; it requires Android 5+ and
special support from phone vendors, and as such is only
available on a small number of phone models.8
5.3 Protocol Design
WiFi Direct enables us to discover other devices without
user intervention, while Bluetooth allows connections
and data transfer without user input. To work around
these limitations, we use both stacks in combination to
7The reason for this difference between user input in WiFi Direct
and Bluetooth is unclear to us. It may be intentional or accidental.
From our perspective as developers, differences like these significantly
increased development time, since they are undocumented.
8We implemented a prototype BLE stack, but do not rely upon it for
our experiments.
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enable both discovery (WiFi Direct) and data transfer
(Bluetooth) without user intervention.
Devices searching for peers over WiFi Direct send
out beacons to other devices. One of the fields of this
beacon is a name field, and it is settable in software
via a hidden API. We set this name to be the Bluetooth
MAC address of the local device. Thus we use WiFi
Direct discovery to communicate a small amount of
information—the Bluetooth MAC address—which is
required to bootstrap a Bluetooth connection. Clients
now can bypass the discovery portion of the Bluetooth
stack; no user interaction is required if the Bluetooth
MAC address of the remote device is already known.
Thus devices can discover each other and communicate
without any user interaction and without rooting the
device. WiFi Direct has greater range than Bluetooth,
but our effective range is limited by Bluetooth since we
must be in range for both technologies.
6 Microbenchmarks
Table 2 depicts our benchmarks of our implementation.
The Total row represents the total time for an exchange
plus the time to locate a peer. Each other row represents
a small experiment we did to measure individual factors
that contribute to the full time in an exchange. The Other
row represents time measured in a full exchange not ac-
counted for by our measurements of individual factors.
6.1 Network
All network benchmarks were performed at a 10 meter
distance between a Nexus 5 and a Nexus 7.9 For each
measurement we performed at least 100 trials.
Measuring an entire exchange. We measured the
time from the beginning to end of an exchange between
two devices, after peer discovery. The devices were
preloaded with 100 messages (140 bytes each) and 30
friends, which resulted in the transmission of approxi-
mately 23.5 KB of data in each direction. In Table 2, we
add the peer discovery time to these values to form our
“Total” row.
Cryptographic Operations. We measured the runtime
of the computations performed for the PSI-Ca protocol.
Initialization of the PSI-Ca protocol takes 350ms on av-
erage. This can be done offline, but we have not im-
plemented this optimization. The online portion takes
260ms on average.
Peer Discovery. We measured the wallclock time be-
tween calling the Android API that starts a peer-finding
scan until the time our application located a nearby peer.
9We found that even using Bluetooth, Rangzen can operate between
devices at distances of 40-50 meters; we limited our experiments to 10
meters since we believed that approximated average distances commu-
nicating devices were likely to experience.
Step Avg StdDev Med 90th%
Peer Discovery 1.18 0.70 0.83 2.18
BT Connect Delay 2.30 0.80 2.19 3.29
BT Latency 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.29
Data Tx 1.52 0.18 1.56 1.75
Crypto 0.61 0.01 0.61 0.62
Other 0.82 — 0.81 0.60
Total (measured) 6.61 1.42 6.18 8.37
Table 2: Breakdown of the time spent during a Rangzen
exchange between two peers in seconds.
Delay of Bluetooth Socket Connection. After peer dis-
covery, the devices involved are aware of each others’
presence but must form a Bluetooth RFCOMM connec-
tion before transmitting data. We measured the time be-
tween requesting such a connection and being informed
by the OS that the connection was ready.
Latency of the Bluetooth Data Channel. We measured
the round-trip time between two devices which were al-
ready connected over Bluetooth. We sent an integer
nonce (4 bytes) back and forth over the channel a single
time, counting the time between the measuring node’s
transmission and its receipt of the echo.
Bandwidth of the Peer-to-Peer Channel. We measured
the raw bandwidth of peer-to-peer Bluetooth links, which
can be viewed primarily as a limiting factor on the num-
ber of broadcast datagrams we can transmit in a single
encounter between peers. These speeds were measured
over a payload size of 150KB. We measured a median of
15.09 KB/s. The 90th percentile lowest bandwidth was
13.41 KB/s. In Table 2 above, we converted these band-
widths into the amount of time required to send 23.5 KB
at that bandwidth. This corresponds to the amount of
data sent in our integrated benchmark for 100 messages
and 30 friends.
6.2 Battery Usage
A key adoption concern is power drain. We measured
the additional battery load imposed on a device, as re-
ported by Android’s battery manager. These tests were
performed on a Nexus 5. We found that Rangzen con-
sumed 5.5% of the device’s battery per hour when com-
municating nearly continuously (by initiating communi-
cation with a nearby device every 10 seconds). This rep-
resents the worst case for battery usage, since it involves
constant communication. We believe that this is reason-
able battery drain given that during a blackout there are
few other means of communication, and thus Rangzen is
a more valuable app in those circumstances.
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6.3 Discussion
Bluetooth’s bandwidth constraint and connection delay
account for about 1/3rd each of the duration of an ex-
change.10 Nevertheless, nodes can discover peers and
communicate hundreds of messages in opportunistic en-
counters of less than 10 seconds. As such, even passers-
by on a street will be in range long enough to permit an
exchange.
7 Simulations and Analytical Results
Our experiments indicate that Rangzen can dissemi-
nate messages quickly at the device level. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate the anonymity and message-spreading
properties of Rangzen at the network level. Rangzen’s
anonymity and reliability depends on large-population
statistics; we conducted several tests with dozens of users
over several weeks, but such small-scale experiments
with real subjects are not indicative of performance at
scale. Therefore, we have simulated Rangzen operating
at city-scale over real mobility traces. We also derive
anonymity properties theoretically, and evaluate our ex-
pressions for the datasets considered. Due to the lack of
large public datasets containing both social and mobil-
ity data, we have used a large-scale mobility dataset and
imposed a social graph using known methods.
For simulating message spread, we used real-world
datasets, including mobility traces (EPFL Cabspot-
ting [57], St. Andrews Locshare [5], University of Mi-
lano PMTR [51], and Technicolor SIGCOMM [56]) and
social graphs (two subgraphs of the Facebook social
graph [50,75]). We also tested our algorithms on datasets
of mobility and social connections [5,12], which in prin-
ciple is what we want, but we found the datasets to be
too sparse in time (Gowalla) and space (St. Andrews) for
effective evaluation, though our results with them were
substantially similar to those we report here.
Our simulator consists of 2100 lines of Java code built
upon MASON [49], a discrete-event multiagent sim-
ulation library. Our simulator accepts social network
graphs or can generate scale-free random social graphs
as needed [1]. The simulator supports various mobility
datasets. It replays agent locations over time and agents
within 20 m11 are made to encounter one another with
some small probability (our simulations use 0.05). This
is meant to simulate unreliable message exchanges for
worst-case evaluations.
Nodes can also be adversarial, which causes them to
perform physical/MAC layer attacks. We model these at-
tacks in a worst-case analysis by assuming that all nodes
within range of the attacking node are unable to com-
municate at all. We do not allow honest nodes to up-
10We found that BLE provides no better performance.
11Our prototype is able to communicate at ranges up to 40-50m, and
sometimes farther.
vote messages, to ensure that simulation results are lower
bounds on message propagation speed.
7.1 Summary of Results
Our results indicate that Rangzen could, despite net-
work attacks, continue to deliver predominantly legiti-
mate messages during an Internet blackout while protect-
ing the anonymity of message authors.
Message propagation. In simulation, Rangzen deliv-
ered messages from honest nodes to over 80 percent of
the population within 24-48 hours, depending on the pri-
oritization noise parameters (Figure 1). Figure 3 indi-
cates that messages from individual popular nodes may
spread up to 33 percent more than those from an entire
adversarial coalition of nodes, and those adversarial mes-
sages have low priority enabling end-device filtering.
Robustness of the network. Figure 4 indicates that
Rangzen is robust to jamming attacks even when 10 per-
cent of the population is an attacker using jammers with
ranges up to 1.3 km. We believe such an attack to be be-
yond the capabilities of a likely adversary. At the proto-
col level, Figure 3 indicates that coalitions of adversarial
nodes cannot dominate network resources as they have
few friends. A coalition of 6 adversarial nodes in a net-
work of 400 nodes performed only marginally better on
average than individual honest nodes selected uniformly
at random.
Protection for users.
Authorship deniability. Users can deny authorship of any
message with non-negligible probability (§7.3).
Device Capture. If an adversary captures b’s device, b’s
friend IDs are password-protected. Without input from
b, an adversary can only learn mutual friends via the
chosen-input PSI-Ca attack. Even with b’s password,
friend IDs are not stored—only hashes are.
Trust Graph Extraction. A resource-limited adversary
cannot learn a significant portion of the trust graph. This
effect can be amplified by randomly adding and deleting
friends in PSI interactions, and limiting the maximum
number of friends that can be fed to the PSI-Ca protocol.
7.2 Message Propagation
Our metrics of success for message propagation are a)
the time required for a message to reach 90 percent of
the honest population, and b) the fraction of honest nodes
that have received a message by a given time. These met-
rics are chosen for use cases like protest organization,
in which mobilization depends on a large portion of the
population cooperating. All plots are averaged over 40
runs. We use epidemic propagation over infinite-storage
devices as an upper bound on the spread rate since a
mesh DTN cannot disseminate content faster than flood-
ing if storage is unconstrained. Since mobility is harder
to model than social relations, we used the Cabspotting
9
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Figure 1: Impact of the Rangzen protocol on legitimate
message propagation without an adversary. The additive
Gaussian noise in priority scores clearly improves prop-
agation, but may hamper the system’s ability to filter out
adversarial messages.
mobility dataset [57] with a randomly-generated Albert-
Bara`basi social graph [1]. The Albert-Bara`basi genera-
tive model lets us create arbitrarily-sized social networks,
and it displays common properties of social networks
like high clustering-coefficient, power-law degree distri-
bution, and short path lengths between nodes.12
7.2.1 Propagation without an adversary
Figure 1 shows the propagation of legitimate messages
with no adversary. The curves represent different dis-
tributions of the noise parameter zi in our trust metric.
Figure 1 suggests that even using random social graphs,
Rangzen can reach at least 80 percent of the popula-
tion within 24 hours and 90 percent of the population
20 hours after infinite-storage epidemic routing does so.
7.2.2 Propagation with a passive adversary
Next, we demonstrate the performance of Rangzen un-
der a passive adversary, which deploys devices that fol-
low the Rangzen protocol, but may also disseminate their
own content. Distinct groups of friends may wish to em-
phasize their own content internally without directly at-
tacking others’ communications. A node with few con-
nections to a social graph cluster can therefore be con-
sidered a passive adversary; its goal is not explicitly to
hinder message propagation within the cluster, but mes-
sages from more popular nodes in the cluster should be
prioritized. This is not a key part of our threat model,
but it relates nonetheless to reducing spam in broadcast
12However, it does not capture other properties of social graphs such
as community development. Also, true social graphs are typically
somewhat correlated with mobility patterns.
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Figure 2: Popular nodes can spread messages faster than
unpopular nodes. This effect is more pronounced when
nodes add less noise prior to transfers (e.g. lower µ). We
expect adversarial nodes to be unpopular.
networks. Figure 2 shows the effects of node popular-
ity on propagation speed. Here, (un)popular nodes were
selected randomly from the 5 percent worst- or best-
connected nodes in the social network. The figure shows
that messages from popular nodes reach 90 percent of the
population as much as 40 hours earlier than messages
from unpopular nodes, for certain noise levels. This
model of communication is consistent with natural hu-
man communication patterns, which tend to favor people
with more social connections.
7.2.3 Propaganda Message Spread
Next we consider an active adversary that controls a node
coalition. Adversaries have few friends but they can
share friend IDs. The adversarial coalition spreads only
its own messages. It can create Sybils, but this is of lim-
ited use since Sybils do not help befriend honest nodes.
We used noise parameters µ = 0.0 and σ2 = 0.1 with a
community of 400 nodes, using almost the entire dataset.
Figure 3 illustrates the propagation time of messages
originating from popular, average, and unpopular honest
nodes, as well as the adversarial coalition; we assume
that 1.5 percent of the population belongs to the adver-
sarial coalition.13 The figure shows that the adversar-
ial coalition can spread messages a little bit better than
average nodes, but at least 30 percent worse than indi-
vidual popular nodes. At very small scales (50 nodes),
we observed that average and unpopular honest nodes
actually performed better than the adversarial coalition
for the first 48 hours. This suggests that Rangzen can
13At its height, the Stasi employed 0.6% of the East German popula-
tion as agents and another 0.9% of the population consisted of “infor-
mal collaborators” [39].
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Figure 3: Adversary propaganda spread.
be used by anyone within tighter social circles, though
one should be well-connected to communicate at a large
scale, just as is often the case in other social networks.
If an adversary were to corrupt popular nodes it could
infiltrate a given social circle. Even offline, this is impos-
sible to prevent. Here we must rely on nodes to gradu-
ally unfriend corrupted nodes. Similarly, if the adversary
corrupts a significant fraction of the population, Rangzen
cannot defend against it. We believe that this will be true
of any decentralized, mobile-mesh-based solution.
7.2.4 Physical Jamming
For a worst-case estimate of physical or MAC-layer at-
tack effects, we first consider a physical-layer attacker
(e.g., a jammer). We model it as a point source of omni-
directional radiation in one of the WiFi frequency bands
(20 MHz bands at either 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz), as a best-
case for the attacker. We assume the attacker targets WiFi
Direct rather than Bluetooth, as Bluetooth employs adap-
tive frequency hopping and channel assessment to avoid
interference. To be conservative, we assume the signal
follows the path loss formula:
PR = PT
(
c
4pid f
)2
where c is the speed of light, f is the signal frequency
in Hz, d is the distance traversed, and PT and PR are the
transmitted and received power, respectively (we assume
equal antenna gains). We ignore factors like diffraction
and absorption, which would significantly weaken a jam-
ming adversary. It is the inverse square factor of path loss
that hampers jamming at scale. We estimate the transmit
power of a smartphone to be 251 mW (corresponding
to average output power over the 5.4 GHz band), and
we estimate the maximum output power of a stationary
jammer to be 20 W in the same WiFi band (based on
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Figure 4: Propagation impact of physical/MAC attacks.
military-grade commercial jammers).14 Under these as-
sumptions, a jammer would need to be within 180 m of
the receiver, with line-of-sight, to jam transmissions be-
tween nodes 20 m apart. This 180 m attack range is in
line with advertised ranges of commercial jammers.
7.2.5 Jamming Simulation
We simulate message propagation in a jamming attack
scenario. For simplicity, we model a “perfect” jammer
(i.e., node pairs located within an attack radius are unable
to propagate messages no matter their distance from the
attacker). To be conservative we consider jammers with
an order of magnitude greater range than we estimated
for commercial jammers above, as an attacker might ex-
tend this range with MAC-layer attacks (e.g., by sending
messages that cause other nodes to not transmit).
We consider mobile and stationary adversaries, both
optimally and non-optimally placed. We model mo-
bile, non-optimal adversaries as nodes in the mobility
trace. Stationary non-optimal attackers are placed uni-
formly within the simulation area. We used a simulated
annealing algorithm to place optimal, stationary adver-
saries [38]. An optimal mobile attacker would have to
know the entire population’s location at every instant in
time (without the benefit of cell-based location tracking),
and solve an NP-hard problem [38]; regardless, we do
not believe such adversaries pose a greater risk than at-
tackers traversing popular routes regularly.
Figure 4 shows the impact of such geography-based
jamming attacks on message propagation; we find that
even when physical/MAC-layer attackers have omnidi-
rectional ranges up to 1000 m, the system propagates at
least 80 percent as well as it does in a best-case non-
14Although many military-grade products advertise high overall
power output, the bandwidth of such products is typically high and
non-configurable; 20 W in the WiFi band is typical.
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Figure 5: Anonymity set size (fraction of nodes) as a
function of the estimator’s confidence level. A point
(0.5,0.2) indicates the smallest set of nodes including
the author with probability 0.5 contains at least 20% of
the nodes.
jamming scenario. While such an attack is unlikely, this
highlights Rangzen’s robustness to localized attacks.
7.3 Analytical Privacy Results
Next we evaluate Rangzen’s anonymity properties and
its resistance to message author identification and social
trust graph extraction.
If the adversary receives a high-priority message from
an honest node, Rangzen should enable the sender to
plausibly deny authorship. For this analysis, we derive
a distribution for the anonymity set, which is the set
of nodes that could have plausibly authored a particu-
lar message. Specifically, we estimate how many hops
a message took since inception, and then estimate how
many nodes are that many hops away for a fixed confi-
dence level. Recall that random noise is added to mes-
sage priority scores before each transmission. This noise
enlarges the anonymity set.
We compute the pmf of the number of hops a mes-
sage traversed before reaching a target node, given the
priority score seen. Suppose node A receives a message
from B. Let N be the number of hops the message tra-
versed before reaching B. S ∈ [0,1] denotes the priority
with which A receives the message from B (before con-
sidering their mutual friends). Ω denotes the event that
the message is observed by a randomly-selected node
(in this case, A). For a worst-case analysis, assume that
A receives the message with priority S = 1. We want
P(N = n|Ω,S = 1) = P(S = 1|N = n,Ω) ·P(N = n|Ω).
We present our modeling of P(N = n|Ω) and P(S =
1|Ω,N = n) in greater detail in Appendix A. Using these
models, we estimate P(N = n|Ω,S = 1) as a function of
n. Combining this with mobility data, we numerically
estimate the anonymity set size for a given trace.
Figure 5 shows the size of the author’s anonymity
set as a function of the estimator’s confidence level—
the probability that the true author is in the anonymity
set—for the SIGCOMM dataset [56]. Using µ = 0.3
and σ2 = 0.1, the 90% confidence anonymity set con-
tains 80% of network nodes. More noise significantly in-
creases the anonymity set size. Anonymity is necessarily
data-dependent because it is always possible to construct
pathological mobility and social trust models in which
the adversary can easily identify the source of messages.
The correct noise parameters should be selected empiri-
cally to balance anonymity with message propagation.
We also consider an adversary who aims to learn
global information about the Rangzen trust graph, such
as which pairs of nodes are friends. This information can
lead to deanonymization through correlation with other
social graphs (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) [54]. In Appendix
B, we show analytically that due to Rangzen’s node ID
protection, this is a difficult attack to scale.
8 Conclusion
Since the advent of the Internet and the rise of democ-
ratized communication there has been a tension between
the communication wants and needs of the many and the
prerogatives of the few in control of the means of com-
munication. Our aim has been to evade this tension by
designing and building a robust, anonymous communica-
tion substrate to evade the shutdown of communications
infrastructure. We did this by designing a lightweight,
anonymous communications protocol; by implementing
that protocol in Android; and by examining the behav-
ior of the protocol and of our implementation in a series
of benchmarks and simulations, showing that Rangzen is
practical and robust at scale. How this tension evolves re-
mains to be seen. An arms race naturally follows the use
of circumvention technology like Rangzen. We believe
that Rangzen provides both a useful means of commu-
nication that is difficult to shut down or co-opt and pro-
vides sufficient protection to the average user to prevent
retribution by an adversarial government.
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A Anonymity Set Details
A message’s priority score S depends on the number of
hops the message took. In particular, we can define the
received priority after N = n hops (Sn) recursively as fol-
lows:
Sn = pn ·Sn−1+ zn
S0 = 1
where zi is the noise added by the ith node, and pi is the
priority score at the ith node. zi’s distribution is designed,
but priority scores pi depend on graph and mobility prop-
erties.
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Figure 6: Proportion of graph edges learned by the ad-
versary (dε ) as a function of ε (proportion of corrupted
nodes).
This priority depends on pi, j, the scaling factor when
messages pass from j to i, as defined in Equation 1. Em-
pirical evidence shows that degree distributions in social
networks obey a power law [14]. We found that in the
Facebook WOSN dataset [75], mutual degree distribu-
tions also obey a power law, but the ratio pi j across all
node pairs appears to be better-modeled by a truncated
sum of exponentials.15 This trust metric is not heavy-
tailed, so the fraction of nodes with highly overlapping
friend sets is very small. This motivates the sigmoid in
equation 1, which assigns high trust even if nodes share
few friends.
We estimated P(N = n|Ω) empirically from several
datasets. For every pair of nodes in the dataset (i, j),
we measured the minimum number of times a message
would need to be forwarded before reaching target j from
source i. This measurement gives an estimated lower
bound on how many hops in the (time-varying) connec-
tivity graph separate an arbitrary message from its cre-
ator.
B Deanonymizing the Social Graph
We quantify what the adversary learns about the true so-
cial graph through attacks on the private set intersection
protocol. As we note in our discussion of non-goals, we
do not consider attacks in which the adversary has both
confiscated large numbers of user devices and unlocked
them (something we are told is uncommon in medium-
risk settings though common in high-risk settings) while
simultaneously correlating the users’ friendship with ex-
ternal social network data sources.
15Technically, this probability is only defined over rational values,
but we approximate the function as having a continuous domain.
Here we assume the adversary knows the nodes V of
the social graph. There are many definitions in the lit-
erature for graph information content [18]. None of the
definitions is clearly superior, so we use the proportion
of common edges as a heuristic metric. That is, if the
original graph is denoted G = (V,E) and the subgraph
is denoted Gs = (V,Es) with Es ⊆ E, then our similarity
metric is dε(G,Gs) =
|Es|
|E| .
This metric is closely related to the definition of graph
entropy by Rashevsky et al. [61] and was also shown
to be strongly correlated with deanonymization success
in [54]. Assuming the adversary can corrupt at most frac-
tion ε of the nodes, we wish to upper bound dε as a func-
tion of ε . We show that the adversary will be unable to
learn more than 15% of the graph edges by corrupting
up to 5% of the nodes, and this can be further limited by
artificially adding and removing graph edges during PSI-
Ca.
Static graph. We first assume the trust graph does not
change. As time tends to infinity, we assume the adver-
sary can learn all edges emanating from nodes it has cor-
rupted. This is a worst-case estimate, because it assumes
the adversary knows how to align its learned subgraph
within the larger trust graph (or a similar social graph
from a different domain). In practice, subgraph align-
ment is difficult.
Figure 6 illustrates the proportion of edges learned as a
function of the proportion of nodes corrupted. The SNAP
dataset is a Facebook ego-social-circle dataset [50], and
the WOSN dataset contains social connections between
55,000 nodes in the Facebook New Orleans network as
of 2009 [75]. The figure suggests that as long as the ad-
versary cannot corrupt more than about 5% of nodes, it
can learn at most 15% of the social graph. This esti-
mate is worst-case; along with the subgraph alignment is-
sues mentioned earlier, corrupting nodes is difficult, and
we expect trust establishment to be less promiscuous in
Rangzen than in Facebook.
Dynamic graph. Next, we assume that the graph is
changing with time. Consider three bins: one with edges
learned by the adversary (L), one with edges not learned
by the adversary (U), and one containing edges that are
not in the graph (X)—i.e., pairs of nodes that are not con-
nected. Each time a new trust relationship is created in
this subgraph, another edge is added to the U bin, and
each time an edge is deleted (i.e. a user “unfriends”
someone) an edge is removed from the L or the U bin.
For a worst-case estimate of privacy, we assume the ad-
versary knows when edges are deleted. Edges move from
U to L whenever the adversary learns another edge in the
graph. Thus we wish to characterize |L|/|L+U |. Re-
call that with a static graph, the adversary could learn at
most a small fraction dε of the total edges in the graph.
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Figure 7: Adversarial learning of a dynamic trust graph.
As such, our dynamic model operates within a restricted
space of nodes and edges. For instance, if the adver-
sary corrupts 5% of network nodes, then NE = X+L+U
equals the number of edges possible between the cor-
rupted 5% of nodes and the rest of the network. Any
equilibrium value of dε in our dynamic model should
therefore be multiplied by the results for the static graph.
Our underlying model for this system is a continuous-
time Markov chain with Poisson events. The state space
of this chain grows exponentially in the number of total
possible edges (NE ), so we use a mean-field approxima-
tion, much like [83]. Figure 7 illustrates our model of
the system. αX is the rate of edge creation, β (U + L)
the rate of edge deletion, and γU the rate at which the
adversary learns new edges.
We know that X(t) = NE − L(t)−U(t) where NE
describes the number of total possible edges. Letting
V (t) = [L(t) U(t)]T , we have a nonhomogeneous time-
invariant linear system:
dV (t)
dt
=
[−β γ
−α −(α+β + γ)
]
V (t)+
[
0
αNE
]
(2)
Observation B.1. Let V (t) = [L(t) U(t)]T , with dynam-
ics described in Equation 2. Then limt→∞
L(t)
L(t)+U(t) =
γ
γ+β .
Proof. (Sketch) It is straightforward to show that dynam-
ical system (2) is internally stable, with exact solution
[
L(t)
U(t)
]
=
 αγN(α−γ+(β+γ)e−(α+β )t−(α+β )e−(β+γ)t)(α−γ)(α+β )(β+γ)
αN(β (α−γ)+−α(β+γ)e−(α+β )tγ(α+β )e−(β+γ)t)
(α−γ)(α+β )(β+γ)
 (3)
We then consider L(t)U(t)+L(t) . Since the exponential
terms in (3) tend asymptotically to 0, the ratio of interest
converges precisely to γ/(γ+β ).
Figure 8 illustrates our analytic results compared to
simulated results. The colored bands are inter-quartile
ranges over 40 trials. These results affirm our mean-
field approximation, not the assumption of constant-rate
learning and social graph alterations. However, our
model does capture the observation that social graph
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Figure 8: Adversarial graph learning, parameterized by
the adversary’s learning rate γ . Asymptotically, the
leaked proportion of graph edges depends only on the
adversary’s learning rate γ and the network-wide edge
deletion rate β . We can increase privacy by systemati-
cally omitting trust graph edges.
properties stabilize globally over time, despite continu-
ing to change locally [40].
This result says two things: 1) if no edges are deleted,
the adversary eventually learns the entire graph, and 2)
asymptotic behavior is independent of the edge creation
rate. Over a long time scale, we cannot rely on natu-
ral social graph growth to limit the adversary’s knowl-
edge. Instead, we should artificially simulate the dele-
tion of edges by (for instance) including random subsets
of users’ friend sets in each PSI-Ca computation, some-
thing we implement in Rangzen.
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